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Is there a fundamental conflict between insulating monetary policy from popular pressures,
seen as essential to sound monetary policy, and making policy responsive to the popular
will, seen as fundamental to democracy? We argue that strongly independent monetary
policy is not inconsistent with democratic control of policymaking, once one realizes that
a key feature of democratic policymaking is the decision to remove some decisions from
“day-to-day” political pressures. This is the essence of “constitutionalism,” central to the
functioning of democracy, by which certain decisions are made difficult to reverse. It is
further argued that a conflict between popular sovereignty and policymaker independence
is not unique to monetary policy, but actually characterizes most policymaking in a
democracy, with institutions designed to insulate policymaking from popular pressures. A
constitutional perspective implies that extreme forms of commitment, such as a dollarization,
are similarly consistent with democracy. One argument for such constraints on monetary
policy (as opposed to fiscal policy, for example) is agreement on what good monetary
policy means.
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I. Introduction
Arguments for alternative exchange rate or international monetary
arrangements are generally framed in terms of economic efficiency, namely,
* This paper was originally prepared for the Conference on Argentine Political Economy,
August 1999, sponsored by the Banco Central de la República Argentina and the Universidad
Torcuato Di Tella. Although I have subsequently refined some of the arguments, I have not2 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
what arrangements will help a country better achieve certain macroeconomic
objectives. With regard to the objective of low inflation, it is usually argued
that this goal will be more likely achieved if monetary policymaking is
significantly insulated from political pressures. In fact, in the design of policy
institutions, central bank independence is widely accepted as a feature of
good policymaking.  Independence means not only the freedom of the central
bank to decide how to pursue its targets, but also that its decisions are very
hard for another branch of government to reverse.
Though central bank independence is widely accepted on economic
grounds, its political status is more problematic, for it is often argued that
there is a fundamental conflict between central bank independence and
democracy. This is the conflict between making policy responsive to the
popular will, seen as fundamental to democracy, and insulating policy from
the popular will, seen as essential to good monetary policy as argued above.
Many see central bank independence as co-existing uneasily with democracy.
Hence, one is led to ask a basic question —to what extent is central bank
independence consistent with basic democratic principles? The purpose of
this paper is to examine the conflict between responsiveness and insulation,
that is, to examine whether or not central bank independence is inconsistent
with principles of democratic policymaking. Our basic argument is that once
one reflects on the process of policymaking in a democracy, strongly
independent monetary policy is not inconsistent with democratic control of
policymaking. We further argue that the conflict between popular sovereignty
and policymaker independence is not unique to monetary policy, but actually
characterizes most policymaking in a democracy. Moreover, institutions we
associate with democracies have been created specifically to address this
conflict.
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Given the Argentinean experience and current debates, I am especially
interested in extreme forms of policy commitment, such as currency boards
or dollarization, from the perspective of their consistency with democratic
principles. In such arrangements there appears to be no domestic sovereignty
over monetary policy. What exactly is the relation between dollarization, for
example, and principles of popular sovereignty or democratic control over
policy? Are they simply disjoint, with such arrangements having sacrificed
popular control in order to achieve price and exchange rate stability? Here, I
argue that this is not the case; a currency board is consistent with democratic
policymaking once one understands the role of constitutionalism in a
democracy.
Before getting into the details, I want to make clear one argument that I
am not making. It has been argued that there is no conflict between central
bank independence and democracy if the central bank is “accountable,” that
is, answerable for its actions and decisions. Under this view, countries,
especially emerging democracies, are urged to set up institutions that are seen
as strongly democratic, as well as highly independent central banks that are
held strictly accountable for their actions. I do not make this argument because
it is too simplistic, ignoring the tension between insulation from and
responsiveness to the popular will. These desirable objectives are prescribed
simultaneously without giving a real sense of tradeoffs or possible
inconsistencies between them. Accountability is important for addressing the
tension between responsiveness and insulation, but full accountability means
that the central bank is not really independent and insulated from political
pressures.  Simple multifaceted prescriptions ignore the reality that is the
subject of this paper.
II. The Generality of the Question
The same question of whether there is a conflict between insulation and
responsiveness can be asked for other policies and the associated institutional
arrangements. Consider defense policy or, on a more economic level, fiscal4 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
policy. The generality of the question alerts one to a key point. In modern
democracies, most policies are chosen by institutions with some degree of
independence, that is, insulation from popular pressures. Basically no
decisions are made by direct democracy. Thus, the question of the tension
between central bank independence and democratic control is not unique to
monetary policy, but brings up a basic issue in policymaking in a democracy.
What distinguishes monetary policy, if anything, is therefore not the fact that
the question is relevant here but not elsewhere, but the degree to which
monetary policymaking is “independent” relative to other types of policy.
A number of points may be useful in understanding the general issue of
policymaking independence. First, one wants to distinguish between
independence in choosing the broad outlines of policy and independence in
more operational decisions to implement these goals. For monetary policy,
independence is often divided into two parts, as in Debelle and Fischer (1995):
goal independence, meaning the central bank sets its own goals, rather than
their being set by another agency; and instrument independence, meaning the
central bank has control over the instruments of monetary policy, and is allowed
to use them. In arguing for the optimality of central bank independence, it is
instrument independence that is meant, with there being agreement that the
central bank should not independently choose the overall goals of monetary
policy. Central bank independence means not only the freedom to decide
how to pursue its goals, but also that other government bodies cannot easily
reverse the central bank’s decisions.
Second, even in discussing decisions on overall goals, one should not
equate democratic control with direct, “unfiltered” expressions of the popular
will. Saying that there should be popular sovereignty in policymaking in a
democracy is different than saying what form this should take. No one argues
that decisions are truly consistent with democracy only if they are made via
direct democracy.  Representative democracy and delegation are the norm in
modern democracies, and the argument that representative democracy is
“undemocratic” is rare.5 CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE, DEMOCRACY, AND DOLLARIZATION
III. What Makes Monetary Policy Different?
All this having been said, there does seem to be a difference between the
independence of  institutions for monetary policymaking, such as a central
bank with explicit or implicit legal independence, and institutions for, let’s
say, fiscal policymaking. Monetary policymaking appears to be far more
insulated and less subject to popular will. What is the case for independence
of the monetary authority? How does this case differ, if at all, from the case
for an independent fiscal authority? We begin with the former question.
In his recent book on central banking in theory and practice, Alan Blinder
(1998), former vice-chairman of the Federal Reserve and continuing scholar
of monetary policy hits the essential point. He argues that a key reason for
independence is that monetary policy, by its nature, requires a very long time
horizon. As he puts it (p. 55-6):
 But politicians in democratic -and even undemocratic- countries are not
known for either patience or long time horizons. Neither is the mass media or
the public. And none of these constituencies have much understanding of the
long lags of monetary policy. So, if politicians made monetary policy on a
day-to-day basis, the temptation to reach for short-term gains at the expense
of the future (that is, to inflate too much) would be hard to resist. Knowing
this, many governments wisely try to depoliticize monetary policy by, for
example, putting it in the hands of unelected technocrats with long terms of
office and insulation from the hurly-burly of politics.
To rephrase his point, monetary policy is like an investment, but an
investment with two crucial characteristics: first, its gestation period is longer
than politicians’ time horizons; and, second, the “technology” of this
investment is not well understood by politicians or the public. These
characteristics of monetary policy as an investment imply that better outcomes
may be achieved by putting decisionmaking control in the hands of an
independent monetary authority.
The argument for independence stresses the risks of too much popular
control, that is, monetary policy too responsive to the popular will.6 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Blinder’s argument hits the essential issue, but also raises a basic question.
It is not only monetary policy that is a long-horizon investment whose nature
is not fully understood by politicians; many types of policy can be seen as
investments with the same characteristics. Politicians’ horizons are similarly
short for other types of policy; nor is it obvious that their understanding of the
technical nature of these policies is greater. Hence we are lead to the second
point raised at the beginning of this section, namely, how does the case for an
independent monetary authority differ from the case for, let’s say, an
independent fiscal authority?
One answer is that there really isn’t any difference in the need to insulate
policy, and that, in practice, other policymaking institutions are similarly
insulated. Hence differences between monetary policy and other types of policy
are more apparent than real. Defense policy provides an example. In all but
the overall objectives, it is made by authorities who, to use our earlier
terminology, are given a large degree of instrument independence. This is
motivated partly by technical considerations, but like monetary policy, there
is also the desire to insulate decisions from political pressures.  In the case of
fiscal policy, however, there are clear differences. There is no independent
fiscal authority comparable to the central bank, nor does it seem there would
be much support for such an institutional arrangement. The details of fiscal
policy are worked out in treasury ministries and legislative committees (that
is, bodies with some insulation), but their decisions must be ratified by
representative legislatures. (As will become relevant below, governments do
put restrictions on fiscal policymaking in order to insulate it from the popular
will.)  In short, there is a difference between monetary policy and other types
of economic policy.
One explanation of this difference is the technical characteristics of
monetary policy. Though many policies can be thought of as investment, the
“technology” of monetary policy makes it especially subject to abuse. More
specifically, one may think of the ease of expanding the money supply, the
seemingly costless short-run term gains that often result, and, the long and
uncertain lags till the costs become apparent. Hence, the benefits of7 CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE, DEMOCRACY, AND DOLLARIZATION
expansionary monetary policy provide an especially strong temptation, while
the costs of irresponsible short-run monetary policy may be less obvious than
the costs of irresponsible tax policy.  It is therefore more necessary to insulate
monetary policy than fiscal policy from popular pressures. This line of
argument is suggested in the quotation from Blinder.
There is much truth in this argument, and it is clearly part of the answer to
what makes monetary policy different, but it is incomplete. The reason it is
incomplete is that part of the “technology” of monetary or fiscal policy
concerns the institutional structure for making policy changes. If a society so
desired, the flow of transfer payments, for example, could be changed with
the same ease, quickly increased or decreased by the decision of a committee
similar to the Federal Open Market Committee (in the United States) and
rapid implementation of those decisions.1 Monetary policy is easy to
manipulate not only because of its economic characteristics, but also because
of the policymaking structure that is in place. To make the same point in
reverse, the technology of fiscal policy that makes it more difficult to abuse it
in part reflects decisions on the nature of policymaking. Hence, an argument
focusing on the ease of changing monetary policy is only part of the answer;
more precisely, it is part of the question.
In my opinion the answer to the question of what makes monetary policy
different is the temptation to inflate in the short run (reflecting the specific
investment nature of monetary policy) combined with the ability of different
interest groups to agree on what monetary policy that is not short-sighted
would look like. It is this second aspect, the ease of concurring on
“disinterested” monetary policy, that is special. If policymakers were somehow
able to constrain themselves to choose monetary policy always for the common
good, there would be agreement on: the problem of inflationary bias; on what
1 Imagine changing the fourth line of the above passage from Blinder to, “So, if politicians
made transfer payment policy on a day-to-day basis, the temptation to reach for short-term
gains at the expense of the future (that is, to hand out too much) would be hard to resist.”
It would be an accurate description of both the possibilities and the temptations.8 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
to do in the medium and long run (policy aimed at low or zero inflation with
no attempt to affect real variables); and, on how to implement this policy. It is
this characteristic, I argue, which explains why societies are willing to turn
over monetary policy to an independent authority, but are less willing to turn
over fiscal policy (or at least some aspects of it) to an analogous fiscal authority.
To better understand the point, let us contrast monetary policy with fiscal
policy. Consider the structure of tax rates or the distribution of transfer
payments.  Suppose that society chose to remove these aspects of fiscal policy
from short-run political pressures by constraining itself to a long-run tax-
transfer policy. Would there be an agreement on the structure of taxes or
transfers similar to that for monetary policy? Almost definitely not, because
of the distributional implications of these policies. That is, there is a clear
conflict of interest over who bears the burden of taxation and/or who benefits
from transfer payments. It is the clear distributional nature of these fiscal
policies that makes it impossible to agree on what “good” long-run tax-transfer
policy is. The heterogeneity or conflict of interests over fiscal policy is different
than monetary policy, and it is this aspect that is crucial in understanding the
political status of independent authorities. Put very roughly, the conflict of
interests in fiscal policy is both across time (the investment aspect) and across
groups with very divergent interests even in a long-run equilibrium, while the
conflict of interests in monetary policy is primarily across time, as set out in
previous paragraphs, with there being far more agreement about optimal policy
in a long-run equilibrium.2 Hence, both knowing the temptation to follow
bad policies and agreeing on the outlines of good policy, we are more
comfortable giving policy over to an independent authority. This is what makes
monetary policy different than some other sorts of economic policy.
This point may be strengthened by considering aspects of fiscal policy
2 One should however note Faust (1996), who argues that the inflationary bias of monetary
policy reflects a conflict of interests between the old, who prefer low unanticipated inflation,
and the young, who prefer high unanticipated inflation, with the latter outnumbering the
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where there is far more agreement both about the dangers of unconstrained
policy and about the structure of optimal constrained policy. The leading
example is fiscal deficits and unbalanced government budgets. The analogy
to monetary policy has several dimensions. There is the temptation to increase
government spending and finance it by issuing debt, as the short run benefits
are high while the current costs often appear low. There is a clear intertemporal
aspect to this decision, deficit spending like inflation having the characteristic
of disinvestment, with the costs of the policy only coming later.  And, there is
agreement that if society were to forgo the short-run temptation and focus on
optimal policy in the long-run, society would want to constrain itself to budgets
that were generally in balance.
Given the similarity of fiscal deficits to inflationary monetary policy, it is
not surprising that we see similar institutions as applied to this specific fiscal
problem. Societies often try to enact some sort of restriction constraining the
ability of the government to run deficits or issue debt, including balanced
budget laws; expenditure ceilings; numerical targets for fiscal variables; and,
restrictions on the issuance of debt. Many countries, especially in Latin
America, have fiscal rules to constrain deficits, with the Maastricht criteria
being an example of fiscal rules motivated by monetary objectives. Forty-
nine out of fifty states in the U.S. have some sort of balanced budget restriction,
and many state constitutions have restrictions on the amount of debt a state
may issue.  In contrast, on the national level in the U.S., the attempt to control
budget deficits by a legislated balanced budget restriction has been
unsuccessful. Given that balanced budget laws are tangential to our main
concern, we do not discuss them here; references include Gramlich (1995),
Poterba (1996) for state level restrictions, von Hagen (1991) for debt
restrictions, Kopits (2001) for a theoretical overview, and chapter 14 of Drazen
(2000) for a summary of both theoretical and empirical work. Our interest is
more to illustrate the general argument about what are the sorts of policies on
which there is wider agreement on optimal policy and governments are willing
to choose to constrain themselves. (Restrictions on capital levies are another
example.)10 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
Though there is a theoretical case for constraining monetary policy to be
non-inflationary or for restricting the ability of governments to run deficits,
both prescriptions have a strong empirical flavor, by which one means that
we have observed that monetary policy (or deficit policy) works better when
governments are so constrained. Having observed the costs of politicizing
certain types of policies, societies have opted (in Blinder’s words) for insulation
from “day-to-day ... temptation to reach for short-term gains at the expense of
the future,” that is, “from the hurly-burly of politics.” By the nature of monetary
policy, we don’t want decisions subject to the daily legislative struggle and
the political pressures this implies. We want policy not subject to “second-
guessing” and easy reversal.
Viewed in this light, the correct conceptual framework to understand
monetary policy is constitutionalism, one key aspect of which is removing
decisions from the influence of everyday political pressures.  We now turn to
this issue.
IV. Constitutionalism in Monetary Policy3
There are four characteristics that we associate with constitutional laws.
First, they are laws that restrict the government’s use of authority. Second,
they set out the basic processes of policymaking, that is, they are laws about
how collective choices should be made. Third, constitutions often treat issues
that are more fundamental than others, such as basic rights or liberties. Fourth,
constitutional laws have more stringent amendment procedures than other
laws, this characteristic reflecting in part the previous two characteristics, in
that certain types of laws are meant to be more permanent.4 All four of these
3 This discussion draws on Drazen (2000), especially chapters 3 and 5.  Insightful discussions
of constitutions that are accessible without a background in legal or political theory are
Elster (1995) and the collection of essays in Elster and Slagstad (1988), especially the
introductory essay.
4 Note that constitutions need not be written documents, nor does the constitutional nature11 CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE, DEMOCRACY, AND DOLLARIZATION
characteristics of constitutional laws are relevant for understanding institutional
arrangements for monetary policy, but especially the last one. We consider
the importance of the first, second, and fourth characteristics in this section,
the third in the next section.
The most straightforward application of constitutionalism to monetary
policy is the characteristic of laws that restrict government’s use of authority.
This has an obvious application to a discussion of how monetary policymaking
institutions can be designed to limit the ability of government to manipulate
monetary policy. It says, in short, that such a limitations are a well accepted
part of a democratic system. This characteristic does not in itself say what
form these limitations should take.
The conceptually most relevant characteristic of constitutional laws for
our discussion is that they have more stringent amendment procedures than
other laws. I argue that in a basic conceptual way, this is central to
understanding the role of central bank independence in a democracy and,
even more so, institutions such as a currency board or dollarization. Let’s
begin with a general discussion. Stringent amendment procedures may be
thought of as a concrete approach to engendering the expectation that a law
will not be changed whenever it is tempting. Such restrictions are often seen
as “protecting the electorate against itself,” so that important decisions will
not be changed or undone whenever the majority feel current circumstances
may warrant it.5 This is the literal application of “stringent amendment
procedures,” that is the decision that once made, certain laws or policies are
of a written (or unwritten) law depend on whether it is in a document called the
“constitution.”  Even though it is not part of a formal law, independence of the Federal
Reserve has the permanence of a constitutional law, because it is generally agreed upon
and thus hard to break.
5 “Constitutionalism then stands for the rare moments in a nation’s history when deep,
principled discussion transcends the logrolling and horse-trading of everyday majority
politics, the object of these debates being the principles which are to constrain future
majority decisions.”(Elster [1988], p. 6)12 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
difficult to undo and cannot be reversed by ordinary legislative or electoral
procedures.
More generally, “stringent amendment procedures” refers to mechanisms
that a society erects to make it difficult to undo decisions, or, in our earlier
terminology, to insulate decisions (or decisionmaking bodies) from the
“momentary temptation” to change these decisions. Put another way, a society
decides to remove an issue from public debate that would lead to undesirable
political pressures. A society decides not to continually redecide and constructs
institutions that enable it to do this. When policies cannot be determined
once and for all, stringent amendment procedures to an existing law cannot
be literally applied; instead, a society can choose to remove the decisionmaking
procedure from short-sighted political pressures. Hence, the second
constitutional characteristic, namely, laws about the process of policymaking
becomes relevant.  This should be seen in the context of “stringent amendment
procedures,” for this tells us conceptually what kind of process is chosen.
Note further that in applying the notion of “stringent amendment
procedures,” either literally or conceptually, we should think not simply in
terms of whether a law is or is not constitutional, but as a matter of degree.
That is, in practice a society makes a constitutional decision of just how difficult
it should be to revisit decisions, that is, just how insulated policymaking should
be from political pressures.
The temptations associated with monetary policy that we discussed in the
previous section make it a strong candidate for being constitutionalized, not
in the literal sense of being written into a formal document called the
“constitution,” but in the sense of insulated from the temptation to adjust
policy for short-run gain at the expense of longer-run considerations. Once
one understands the role of constitutionalism in a democracy, one sees that
central bank independence is in no sense inconsistent with democratic
principles. The nature of monetary policy means that a society makes a
conscious decision to remove it from short-sighted political pressures in exactly
the way that other policy choices have been removed. Having made the13 CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE, DEMOCRACY, AND DOLLARIZATION
decision to insulate policy from political pressures, the question is how to do
so.
V. Dollarization – A Fundamental Right?
We can now consider the status of currency boards or dollarization in a
democracy. By this point, the basic arguments have been made and we simply
bring them together. A careful reader of the paper could make the arguments
himself. Especially strong forms of commitment to price stability or fixed
exchange rates can be seen as simply clear examples of constitutionalism,
especially when seen as an application, at least conceptually of “stringent
amendment procedures.” The argument that removing policy from domestic
control (or domestic sovereignty, defined as the formal ability of a country to
choose policy on its own rather than under instruction from another country)
is undemocratic misses the whole point, both in terms of the tensions that are
inherent in democracy and in terms of the solutions, such as constitutionalism,
that democracies have found to address these tensions.
One may argue that dollarization is conceptually different than giving the
central bank independence, for the latter is insulating policies from pressures,
while the former is abandoning all decision power over monetary policy. A
review of the previous section indicates that this difference simply parallels
the literal versus more conceptual application of “stringent amendment
procedures.” Appointing an independent central bank corresponds, as already
indicated in the previous section, to the more conceptual application of the
constitutional characteristic. Dollarization, seen as making the difficult-to-
reverse decision to adopt U.S. monetary policy, is simply the literal application
of the principle of “stringent amendment procedures.” Is it really conceptually
different than laws restricting property seizure or length or number of terms
of elected officials? All are examples of constitutional laws.
One should carefully note that the argument that has been made is not that
dollarization is a “good” economic policy per se. The argument is simply that
there is no fundamental inconsistency with democracy, or, more exactly, the14 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
democratic principle of popular control. Having made the case for this in
previous sections of the paper, in this section I consider two further
constitutional issues here: whether dollarization or some other monetary
arrangement should be constitutionalized in the literal sense of writing it into
the constitution; and, very briefly, the argument against policy insulation in
an emerging democracy.
The argument of whether a dollarization law, for example, should be
formally put in the constitution turns on whether doing so makes it harder to
reverse. Two constitutional characteristics come into play. “Stringent
amendment procedures” is important in its most literal sense, in that laws that
are written in the document called the “constitution” are, by the process of
making laws, more difficult to undo. As already indicated, a law that is very
difficult to reverse need not be in the “constitution,” but in a mechanical
sense it is harder to reverse if it is.
A more subtle argument concerns the importance of the constitutional
characteristic not yet discussed, namely that constitutional laws often treat
issues that are more fundamental than others, such as basic rights or liberties.
This seems out of place when discussing technical arrangements like central
bank operating procedures or, even more so, dollarization. What is fundamental
about low inflation or a fixed exchange rate?6 We  suggest the following
argument.
When a law is generally perceived as treating a fundamental issue, this
perception, by its nature, will strengthen the expectation that the law won’t
be quickly changed. That is, there is a close connection between the view that
a law is fundamental and that it is permanent. To the extent that a law is seen
as regulating a basic right, basic in the sense that it is seen as holding across
a wide range of circumstances, there is, by definition, the expectation that the
law is permanent. In this sense, independent of any implied legal  restrictions
6 What is “basic” about the prohibition in the U.S. Constitution against a state using anything
other than gold or silver coin as legal tender (Article 1, section 10, clause 1)?  See, however,
The Federalist, No. 44 for a discussion suggesting what may be “basic” about this provision.15 CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE, DEMOCRACY, AND DOLLARIZATION
on changing the law, “constitutionalizing” a law sends the signal that a society
sees the law as one not to be tampered with.
While some restrictions (such as freedom of speech) are obviously
fundamental and hence permanent, others are not so obviously fundamental,
so that constitutionalizing them invests them with an importance they would
not otherwise have. For example, zero deficits is not a “fundamental right;” a
balanced budget restriction in the constitution sends the signal that a society
attaches fundamental importance to it. The same argument could be made
about price stability or restrictions on devaluation.
VI. Issues in Emerging Democracies and Conclusions
Finally, are there any special issues concerning an emerging democracy,
that is, one in which there may be a need to strengthen (or at least reconfirm)
democratic principles or the democratic process itself? The argument that
has been made is that insulation of some aspect of policymaking from popular
pressure tends to weaken the overall commitment to democracy, which may
be risky if this commitment is not as firmly in place as in a more established
democratic system.
The short answer is that this argument is flawed in at least three dimensions.
The first is the general point made in this paper, namely that insulation is not
only not inconsistent with democracy, but an essential part of the democratic
process. The second way in which the argument is too simplistic is a
continuation of the first. To the extent that independent policy authorities
characterize democracies, the creation of such bodies should help cement,
rather than undermine the democratic process in an emerging democracy.
This argument, however, applies less to dollarization than to an independent
central bank.
The final argument is more empirical and applies to any sort of independent
monetary institution or arrangement. Even if one believed that an independent
central bank (or a currency board, et cetera) was undemocratic, a focus on
this issue is misplaced in most emerging democracies. Put simply, in an16 JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS
emerging democracy there are so many other, more problematic institutions,
that the central bank should not be in the forefront of our attention. The
democratic nature of political parties, elections, the bureaucracy, or an
independent judiciary, to take some examples, are all generally more important.
Singling out the central bank makes little sense if one is really concerned
about cementing the commitment to democracy. In fact, it is often demagoguery
meant to appeal to naive populist sentiments or to divert attention from more
important issues.
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